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DISCRIMINATION IN PUBLIC HOUSING
UNDER THE HOUSING AND COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1974:
A CRITIQUE OF THE NEW
HAVEN EXPERIENCE
ELLEN GESMER *
The Housing and Community Development Act of 19741 (HCDA)
sets as a major goal the establishment of communities composed of
persons with a wide range of incomes.' Under the Act, each local
public housing authority must agree in its contract with the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to pursue: "tenant selec-
tion criteria designed to assure that, within a reasonable period of time,
the project will include families with a broad range of incomes and will
avoid concentrations of low-income and deprived families with serious
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Joseph L. Tauro, United States District Court, Boston
Massachusetts. B.A., Radcliffe College, 1972; J.D., Yale Law School, 1976.
1. Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 12, 15,20,31,
40, 42, 49 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1975)) [hereinafter cited as HCDA].
2. Specifically the Act calls for:
[T]he reduction of the isolation of income groups within communities and geo-
graphical areas and the promotion of an increase in the diversity and vitality of
neighborhoods through the spatial deconcentration of housing opportunities for
persons of lower income and the revitalization of deteriorating or deteriorated
neighborhoods to attract persons of higher income ....
HCDA § 101(c)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 5301(c)(6) (Supp. V 1975).
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social problems." 3 This requirement can be implemented by two pri-
mary methods. First, local housing authorities can achieve income mix
by altering their admissions criteria to favor higher income tenants
with socio-economic characteristics different from those of current
tenants. This approach has been used by housing authorities of several
cities, including New Haven, 4 Wilmington, 5 and Kansas City.6 The
second approach, is to distribute new tenants among existing projects
so that each project has a range of incomes and social characteristics.
This second method of implementation would be furthered by con-
struction of scatter-site, low-density public housing in neighborhoods
where the existing population would provide a balance to the popula-
tion of the public housing units, thus preventing the creation of neigh-
borhoods with concentrations of deprived families. This Article argues
that given the limited supply of public housing units, the latter method
of implementing the income mix policy is more acceptable. 7 Following
the former course, altering admissions criteria, creates direct conflict
with two other major goals of the national housing policy: providing a
remedy for "the acute shortage of decent, safe and sanitary dwellings
for families of low income," 8 and providing for "fair housing through-
out the United States," 9 to be implemented by the elimination of
discrimination in the sale or rental of housing.'0 In addition, the first
method may conflict with the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment insofar as it leads to impermissible discrimination on the
basis of race, and possibly on the basis of sex, income level and source
of income."
3. HCDA § 201d(c)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c)(4)(A) (Supp. V 1975), amending 42
U.S.C. § 1401(g) (1937). The statute says specifically that pursuit of this policy "shall not
permit the maintenance of vacancies to await higher income tenants when lower income
tenants are available." Id.
4. See notes 42-61 and accompanying text infra.
5. Telephone interview with Mary Hitchener, Executive Director, Wilmington Hous-
ing Authority, April 21, 1975.
6. See Bradley v. Housing Auth., 512 F.2d 626,627 (8th Cir. 1975).
7. This Article will assume that the creation of balanced communities is a valid goal.
This goal, however, has been attacked in sociological literature. See, e.g., Gans, The
Balanced Community: Homogeneity or Heterogeneity in Residential Areas, in HOUSING
URBAN AMERICA 137 (Pynoos ed. 1973); Piven & Cloward, The Case Against Urban
Desegregation in HOUSING URBAN AMERICA 100 (Pynoos ed. 1973).
8. HCDA § 201,42 U.S.C. § 1437 (Supp. V 1975), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1937).
9. Fair Housing Act § 801, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970).
10. Id. 88 3603-04.




I. THE POLICY AND ITS RATIONALE
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 is devoted to
fostering a pattern of "income mix" in public housing, leased housing
and other forms of federally assisted housing.12 To effect this, the Act
prescribes changes in a number of specific areas.
First, the Act amends tenant selection criteria for public housing by
adding new factors. It retains the old statutory preferences for certain
categories of applicants, such as families displaced by urban renewal,
veterans and disabled servicemen and requires that local housing au-
thorities consider such factors as the applicants' age or disability,
present housing conditions, urgency of housing need and source of
income. 13 In addition, the Act requires that each housing authority use
selection criteria to achieve income mix. 14
Secondly, the Act redefines "low-income public housing" by replac-
ing the requirement that dwellings in low income housing be available
solely to families of low income 5 with the more general statement that
"the term 'low income housing' means decent, safe, and sanitary
dwellings within the financial reach of families of low income." 16 In
the same section, it specifies that "at least 20% of the dwelling units in
any project shall be occupied by very low income families."' 7 Under
the Act, a very low income family is defined as one whose adjusted
income does not exceed fifty percent of the median family income for
the area.'" This means that a housing authority in New York City,
where the median income was $9,862 in 1974,19 need only fill twenty
percent of its housing units with families having adjusted incomes
12. There is nothing in the Act itself or in the legislative history to indicate that
Congress intended, when setting this new goal, to override the existing goal of providing
decent homes for low income families. See notes 30-33 and accompanying text infra.
This Article is concerned only with fully subsidized, low-income, public housing. For an
analysis of income mix clauses relevant to other publicly assisted housing, leased
housing and mortgage financing, see NATIONAL HOUSING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
LAW PROJECT, LAW PROJECT BULLETIN (Oct. 15, 1974, Berkeley, Cal.).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1401(g)(2), as amended, HCDA § 201, 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (Supp. V
1975).
14. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1) (1970).
16. HCDA § 201a(l), 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(1) (Supp. V 1975).
17. Id. § 201a(l)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(1)(B).
18. Id. § 201a(2), 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(2) (Supp. V 1975), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1402(2)
(1937).
19. NATIONAL HOUSING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT LAW PROJECT, LAW PROJECT
BULLETIN (Oct. 15, 1974, Berkeley, Cal.).
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under $4,841, and all of those families may be at the upper end of that
range. Since the housing authority may charge higher rents to families
with higher incomes, 20 there is a financial incentive to fill only the
minimum number of units with "very low income families" and to
choose those families from the upper end of the permissible income
range. Furthermore, there is no requirement in the statute that housing
authorities do otherwise. Therefore, these provisions may deny public
housing to those applicants significantly below the "very low income"
cutoff.
Third, the Act permits and encourages housing authorities to admit
and retain tenants with much higher incomes by eliminating the con-
tinued occupancy rule, under which a family whose income had in-
creased above the approved maximum was required to move from the
project unless the public housing authority determined that the family
could not find suitable housing elewhere. 21 Elimination of this clause
permits families with increased incomes to stay in public housing.22
The legislative history reveals two major reasons for implementing
an income mix policy. The primary argument as set forth by the
House23 and Senate24 Committees was that income mix is an "essential
ingredient in creating economically viable housing" since higher in-
come tenants pay higher rents.25 By 1973, members of Congress be-
lieved that public housing had reached a point of economic crisis26 and
prescribed income mix as a fundamental part of the solution.
20. HCDA § 201a(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(1) (Supp. V 1975), amending 42 U.S.C. §
1402(1) (1970).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1410(g)(3) (1970). Where an "over-income" family was permitted to
remain, the rent was raised accordingly. Id. See also HCDA § 201a(l), 42 U.S.C. §
1437a(1) (Supp. V 1975), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1) (1970).
22. The old system was said to penalize those who worked to obtain higher incomes
and to deprive those left behind of an example of a hard working family. See Cahn &
Cahn, War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J. 1317, 1342 (1964).
23. H.R. REP. No. 1114, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1974).
24. S. REP. No. 693, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1974).
25. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
26. The Committee [on Banking and Currency) is greatly disturbed over the
widening gap between the revenues received and the costs incurred by local public
agencies in administering the public housing program.
. . . [S]ome agencies are on the brink of bankruptcy, while for many others,
essential property maintenance and tenant services must be indefinitely deferred.
The committee believes the solution is not in merely providing more Federal
subsidy dollars for these projects. What is also needed, in conjunction with statu-
tory reform, is a greater assumption of responsibility by local agency management
and by the tenants living in the project.




The second argument was that income mix would create a "healthier
social environment.' '27 There was an unstated assumption that the
mere presence of a tenant population mixed by income would by itself
create a more socially viable housing project.
In support of this argument, Senator Buckley suggested that "social
incentives are created when upward mobility can be observed within a
community." 28 Senator Brock pointed out that when poor families are
concentrated in one area, the local housing authority may not be able
to provide the community services "to offer them an alternative to
poverty and to disadvantaged circumstances." 29 Representative Har-
rington submitted a study of tenants in mixed income projects in
Massachusetts that found that "mixed income tenants are happier than
those in segregated housing." 30
Some Congressmen criticized the policy of fostering income mix
through the tenant selection process as being in conflict with the
national goal of providing housing to those who are least able to obtain
it in the private market. 31 HUD Secretary James Lynn recognized that
the Administration did not know whether those persons excluded from
public housing by the new bill would be able to find decent private
housing.32
Senator Brooke criticized the policy on constitutional grounds. He
argued that local housing authorities would pass over low income
27. S. REP. No. 693, Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1974).
28. 120 CONG. REc. 6168 (1974).
29. Id. at 6165 (1974).
30. Id. at 21320-21 (1974), citing Gallese, Living Together-Massachusetts Tries
Mixing Income Groups in Subsidized Housing, Wall St. Journal, June 25, 1974, at 1, col.
I. Congressman Harrington failed to mention, however, that the study suggested the
reasons for the tenants' satisfaction were the design and management of the buildings,
not the social characteristics of the tenant population.
31. For example, the original language of the Senate version provided that income
mix requirements would be unacceptable if they "have the effect of denying admission
to any family on the basis that its income is too low." S. REP. No. 693, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 4 (1974). See also the remarks of Congressman Ashley emphasizing the importance
of not losing sight of the "generally accepted national objectives: eliminating and
preventing slums, blight and deterioration, providing lower income housing and improv-
ing community facilities and services." 120 CONG. REC. 20217 (1974); see Hearings on
H.R. 10036, 7277, 10688 and 10689 before the Subcomm. on Housing of the House
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1200, 1203 (1973)
(statement of James R. Harvey, Housing Task Force, Leadership Conference on Civil
Rights).
32. Hearings on S. 2490, 2507, 2508 before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1973) (letter from Secretary Lynn to Senator
Brooke).
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families in the applicant pool and admit higher income applicants, thus
postponing indefinitely the admission of the poorest families into pub-
lic housing. This would violate the equal protection and due process
clauses of the Constitution, he argued, because "it attaches additional
burdens to the poorest applicants and because it will exclude an entire
group, the very neediest, from new admissions in most cities. ' '33
Senator Brooke was the only member of Congress to suggest that the
income mix policy mandated by the Act might lead to constitutionally
impermissible discrimination. No member of Congress addressed the
possible impact of the provision requiring that the tenant selection
process avoid "concentrations of low income families with serious
social problems." 34 Nor was there any discussion of how this provision
would be implemented on the local level.
The effect of the Act can be assessed most accurately by examining
its implementation by local housing authorities. This is necessary be-
cause of the longstanding congressional policy of "vest[ing] in local
public housing agencies the maximum amount of responsibility in the
administration of their housing programs" 35 and because the policies of
the Act rest on assumptions which should be susceptible to empirical
verification.
The Housing Authority of the City of New Haven (New Haven)
provides a useful case study of the implementation of the income mix
program.36 New Haven was chosen in 1972 to conduct a pilot project in
the use of tenant selection criteria designed to create balanced com-
munities in public housing under HUD's Housing Management Im-
33. 120 CONG. REC. 28143 (1974). See also notes 80-137 and accompanying text infra.
34. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
35. HCDA § 201,42 U.S.C. § 1437 (Supp. V 1975), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1937);
see also [1949] U.S. CODE CONG. SERVICE 1551.
36. The Housing Authority of the City of New Haven manages a total of eleven low
rent family housing projects, three middle income family projects and fifteen low income
projects for the elderly comprising a total of 4,364 units of housing, or about 10% of the
city's households. New Haven Housing Authority, Summary of NHHA Tenants, Nov.
1, 1974 (on file with the Urban Law Annual); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS. DEPT. OF
COMMERCE, CENSUS TRACT REPORT, NEW HAVEN CONN. (No. PHC(1) 142, 1970).
This Article is concerned solely with the 1789 units of low income family housing,
because the admissions procedures for the state administered moderate income and
elderly projects have not significantly incorporated the controversial admissions criteria
mandated by the Act. The eleven low income family projects were built between 1941
and 1973, and range from six high density highrise units housing 368 families in two
blocks to scattered townhouses almost indistinguishable from the private homes sur-




provement Program.3 7 The city was chosen to perform a demonstration
project because of the quality of its proposal, its good record in urban
planning and the transferability of its results to housing authorities
throughout the country.38 HUD has now distributed a summary of all
the Housing Management Improvement Program demonstration pro-
ject results, including the New Haven project, to local authorities
nationwide, suggesting that they consider the project results as possi-
ble models for their own efforts.3 9
In addition, there is evidence that New Haven had begun the use of
similar guidelines, informally and on its own initiative, before the
beginning of the pilot program.40 As a result, New Haven had already
substantially implemented the goals set by the Housing and Communi-
ty Development Act before the Act became effective on January 1,
1975. Therefore, the situation in New Haven strongly suggests the
patterns that will increasingly emerge in cities around the country as
the Act is fully implemented.
Year
Project Built Neighborhood Units
Elm Haven 1941 Dixwell 487
Quinnipiac Terrace 1941 Fair Haven 248
Farnum Courts 1942 Wooster Square 300
Rockview 1951 West Rock 202
Elm Haven Extension 1955 Dixwell 368
County & Henry Sts. 1965 Dixwell 9
Riverview 1967 Fair Haven 12
Sheffield Manor 1970 Newhallville 36
EssexTownhouses 1971 EastShore 35
Valley St. Townhouses 1974 West Hills 40
Waverly St. Townhouses 1973 Dwight 52
37. NEW HAVEN HOUSING AUTHORITY. DESCRIPTION OF THE MANAGEMENT DEMON-
STRATION PROJECT AND THE TENANT ORIENTATION PROGRAM 1, (Dec. 21, 1973) [hereinaf-
ter cited as NHHA DESCRIPTION] (on file with the Urban Law Annual).
38. Telephone interview with Julian Lowe, Director, Technical Memoranda Staff,
Housing Management, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Jan. 23, 1977.
39. Telephone interview with William J. Monahan, Editor, Technical Memoranda
Staff, HUD, Jan. 26, 1977; HUD, Housing Management Improvement Program, Project
Summary and Index, Technical Memorandum No. 3, at i & 22 (Nov. 1976).
40. Interview with Cooper Winston, Assistant Director for Administration, New
Haven Housing Authority, Jan. 22, 1975; see also notes 58 and 60 infra (note the change
in characteristics of tenants and applicants to New Haven's public housing projects since
1965).
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II. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAM:
GENERAL CONFLICTS WITH STATUTORY GOALS
A. Background
In 1971, citing concern over "excessively high operating costs" and
the "deplorable deterioration of low-rent public housing projects,"
HUD issued a circular encouraging each local housing authority to
create a "better economic and social cross section in its tenant
body.' 41 In response to this mandate, New Haven modified its tenant
selection process. 42 In choosing tenants for units completed in 1971,
New Haven informally used a series of indices including amount and
source of income, sex of head of household and race.
43
In 1973 New Haven began a management demonstration project to
test the impact on projects of "mixed income tenancy" and "rigorous
tenant selection." The experiment was undertaken as part of the
HUD-funded Housing Management Improvement Program. Two new
projects, comprising ninety-two units, were involved. The goal of the
41. HUD suggested that each local housing authority:
I. Review and analyze its application intake and pool and take steps to stimulate
interest in and increase applications from more wage earner and two-parent families
having greater potential for stability.
2. Renew income limits for admission and continued occupancy ....
3. Attempt, through all practicable means, to retain stable, eligible and over-
income families in occupancy until such time as they are, in fact, able to obtain
standard housing within their ability to pay.
Housing a Cross-Section of Low-Income Families in Low-Rent Public Housing (HUD
Circular HM 7465.12, June 2, 1971).
42. Interview with Edward White, Executive Director, New Haven Housing Author-
ity, Nov. 16, 1974; interview with Sheila Randall, Director, Tenant Application Office,
New Haven Housing Authority, Nov. 14, 1974.
43. Interview with Winston, supra note 40. Prior to 1968, admission to the New
Haven Housing Authority was based largely on the applicant's "suitability" as judged
by a housing authority officer during an informal home visit. Interview with former
housing authority employee, Oct. 31, 1974. Such factors as the tenant's arrest record,
housekeeping habits or the presence of illegitimate children in the family might be taken
into account. Interview with White, supra note 42.
In 1968, the housing authority shifted to a system of taking applicants only on the basis
of the date of application, after taking into account the availability of appropriate
apartments and the statutorily mandated preferences for veterans and displaced persons.
NEW HAVEN HOUSING AUTHORITY, ANNUAL REPORT 5-6 (1968). Executive Director
White attributed the shift to financial concerns and the New Haven Housing Authority's
obligation to avoid de facto segregation; however it also coincided with the issuance of a
HUD circular limiting the discretion a local housing authority could use in tenant
selection. Admission and Continued Occupancy Regulations for Low Rent Public Hous-
ing (HUD Circular, Dec. 17, 1968). This policy led to a high concentration of black
families in the authority's projects. Interview with White, supra note 42. The authority
also felt that it led to the admission of a large number of "undesirable" tenants, including
welfare mothers, female-headed households and muti-problem families. Interview with
former employee of the New Haven Housing Authority, supra. The authority officially
maintained the chronological selection procedure until approximately 1971. Interview




program was to create a tenant population: (1) in which twenty percent
of the families earned less than $4,000 a year, fifty percent earned
between $4,000 and $8,000, and thirty percent earned more that $8,000;
(2) in which only half the families were black; (3) in which three-
fourths of the families were headed by males; and (4) in which three-
fourths of the family heads were employed.4 These last three quotas
were apparently set "arbitrarily." 45 New Haven was relatively suc-
cessful in reaching all but the racial goal. 46
In October 1974, New Haven adopted for its overall tenant selection
process the policies used in the demonstration projects.47 According to
the preamble of the housing authority's new regulations, they were
adopted in accordance with the Housing and Community Development
Act, although it was not yet in effect and HUD had not yet published
implementing regulations. 48 Specifically New Haven's regulations
state:
An applicant will be offered an apartment after all families ahead
of the applicant by reason of date of application and/or preference
category . . . have been offered an apartment subject to the
Authority's policy objective to achieve a balanced occupancy
mix. That is, in selecting families for vacant apartments the Au-
thority will make an effort to achieve a balanced occupancy mix in
terms of income levels, .... race, sex of head of household, and
source of income. 49
44. NHHA DESCRIPTION, supra note 37.
45. Interview with Winston, supra note 40.
46. Goal ActualAchievement
Income 30% high 33%
50% medium 41%
20% low 26%
Sex of Head of 75% male 73%
Household 25% female 27%
Employment Status 75% unemployed 77%
25% employed 23%
Race 50% black 86%
50% white or other 14%
NHHA DESCRIPTION, supra note 37, at 1-2.
47. NEW HAVEN HOUSING AUTHORITY, POLICIES FOR ADMISSION AND CONTINUED
OCCUPANCY (1974) [hereinafter cited as POLICIES].
48. HUD did publish interim guidelines on admission to public housing. 40 FED. REG.
33445 (1975). The regulations required that admissions policies should not automatically
deny admission to a particular category of applicants or attribute behavior to an appli-
cant on the basis of a group of which he is a member. 24 C.F.R. § 860.204.
49. POLICIES, supra note 47, § 503.00. The "preference categories" referred to are
those established by statute, e.g., displacees, veterans and servicemen, families in an
19771
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
In apparent contradiction, the regulations provide that the authority
shall not discriminate in the leasing of public housing against any
applicant because of race, color, creed, sex, marital status or national
origin and shall not deny to any eligible applicant the opportunity to
lease housing.50 In addition, the regulations provide that the authority
may not deny admission to a family because its income is derived
wholly or in part from public assistance."
The actual admissions procedure does not mirror the regulations. In
practice, the criteria used are within the discretion of the individual
project managers. 52 It is also difficult to obtain compliance with the
regulations because an applicant is not informed when his application
is rejected by a project manager. Instead, the applicant remains on the
waiting list53 and long tenure on the waiting list has not been recognized
as the legal equivalent of a rejection.5 4
B. Effects of the Policy
Assuming that New Haven's implementation is fairly representative,
the income mix policy and the policy of disfavoring welfare recipients,
emergency situation, families with other serious housing needs and families wishing to
transfer within public housing because of a change in family size. Id. §§ 402.01-05.
50. Id. § 203.00.
51. Id. § 206.00.
52. According to the regulations, the selection of tenants from among eligible appli-
cants involves several steps. First a project manager notifies the Tenant Application
Office (TAO) of a vacant apartment. Id. § 504.01. At this point, the project manager may
indicate what kind of tenant he would like, according to race, sex of head of houshold,
income range and/or source of income. Interview with Randall, supra note 42; interview
with Mel Norfleet, Project Manager, New Haven Housing Authority, Dec. 10, 1974.
Then the TAO forwards to the project manager the folder of "the first applicant in line
for the appropriate size of apartment." POLICIES, supra note 47, § 504.02. Actually, the
TAO sends over the folders of the next several applicants in line who meet the criteria
set out by the project manager. Interview with Randall, supra note 42. The project
manager either contacts the applicant to look at the apartment or, if he finds the
applicant unacceptable, returns the file to the TAO and the applicant retains the same
priority status. POLICIES, supra note 47, § 504.03.
53. Interview with Randall supra note 42.
54. A long tenure on the waiting list is equivalent to rejection but has not been so
recognized by the housing authority. A rejected applicant is entitled to a hearing before a
three-person grievance panel, to contest the decision and present further evidence. 42
U.S.C. § 1410(g)(4)(i) (1969), as amended, HCDA § 201(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c)(3)(i)
(Supp. V 1975). Applicants who are placed on the waiting list, however, have no
recognized statutory right to a hearing, even though they may remain on the waiting list
for ten years or more. This problem was recognized in Holmes v. New York City
Housing Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968):
The possibility of arbitrary action is not excluded here, however, by the existence
of this reasonable regulation. The "scoring system" scheme will hardly assure the
fairness it was devised to promote if, as the plaintiffs allege, some applicants, but
not others, are secretly rejected by the Authority, are not thereafter informed of





female-headed families and black families conflict with the statutory
goals in two respects. They conflict with the general goal of providing
decent and safe housing for persons otherwise unable to afford it and
they do not further the goal of establishing balanced communities.
While these effects may appear obvious, they were not considered by
Congress when the new Act was passed.
First, these policies effectively exclude from public housing those
who need it most. New Haven's experience suggests that the very
people who have the greatest difficulty finding adequate housing in the
private market are being denied public housing. 5 According to a study
released in 1975 by the United States Commission on Civil Rights,
there is substantial discrimination against blacks and female heads of
families in the private rental market.56 Welfare recipients also face
substantial discrimination as a class.57 These are the people who are
applying in New Haven but are being passed over in the allocation of
public rental units.
55. The discussion of the impact of the housing authority's admissions policies on the
applicants and on tenant population results from an analysis of the available data on the
demographic characteristics of the tenants of New Haven's eleven low income housing
projects and of the applicants for those units. The tenant data came from the housing
authority's Monthly Project Files for Nov. 1974, and the applicant data came from the
printout of the applicant list as of Oct. 31, 1974 (on file with the Urban Law Annual).
Tenant data was available for 1,670 tenant families. For 39 families, no data was
available. The other units were vacant at the time. For tenants, data was available as to
race (black, white, Spanish, other); sex of head of household; source of income (em-
ployed, full welfare, partial welfare, other benefits, other); income levels (within $1,000
ranges); and number of children. The source of income category created some ambiguity
because of the overlap between the persons categorized as employed, on partial welfare
and receiving other benefits. Analysis of the tenant data included calculation of percent-
ages of families which are white, headed by two parents, headed by an employed person,
fully supported by welfare and in different income categories. These percentages were
also examined for the total population of the five housing projects built between 1941
and 1955 and the six projects built since 1966.
The applicant data was separated according to size of apartment needed. The data on
applicants seeking studio or one-bedroom apartments was not considered since appli-
cants for those units are primarily elderly. The remaining applicant data covered 1,174
families. For 278 families, the data was incomplete with respect to income level, and for
64 others the data was incomplete in some other way. The compilations of data exclude
only the latter 64. Information on each applicant included his race, veteran status,
number of parents in the household, size of income, source of income and application
date. The data as to size of income is likely to be inaccurate, since the TAO does not
verify applicant incomes until the families are about to be placed. The large number of
black applicants and tenants with low incomes, on welfare or in families headed by
females is indicated in notes 58-61 infra. Such applicants are those needing public
housing most.
56. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN: EQUAL OPPORTU-
NrrY IN HOUSING 137-67 (1975).
57. See, e.g., New Haven Journal Courier, April 24, 1975, at 1, col. 7.
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While more than ninety percent of the families on the waiting list are
one-parent families, only forty-three percent of the families in the
newer units and eighty-four percent of the families in the older units
are headed by a single parent. 58 Similarly, only twenty-three percent of
58. Demographic Characteristics of Applicants to and Tenants
in New Haven Low Income Family Housing
Percentage of Families Who Are:
Date Total Whiteb Two





































454 4.4 19.4 33.5 29.7
225 21.8 17.3 26.7
9.7 46.2
24.9 41.3
345 1.7 12.5 22.0 58.8
33 27.3 54.5 45.5
33 48.5 69.7 57.6 15.2
52 19.2
40 17.5 60.0 72.5 22.5
a. On whom data is available.
b. New Haven defines racial goals in terms of the ratio between the number of black
tenants and the number of tenants of all other races. See note 44and accompanying
text supra.
c. For tenants this figure may include families who receive partial welfare assistance,
while for applicants it probably does not.
The slightly closer correspondence between the tenants of the older projects and the
applicants can be explained by two factors. First, the older projects were largely filled
pursuant to a first-come, first-serve policy. Second, there has been only a relatively
minor attempt to institute the new policy in filling vacancies in these projects since the




the applicants are employed, as compared to sixty percent of the
tenants in the newer units. Seventy-seven percent of the applicants are
on full welfare, while only twenty percent of the residents in the newer
housing receive welfare. 5
9
The same pattern exists with respect to level of income.6° While
almost sixty percent of those applicants who reported income earn less
than $4,000, fewer than twenty-five percent of the tenants in the new
units have incomes under $4,000. In addition, while fewer than three
percent of the applicants have incomes over $8,000, almost twenty
percent of those in the new units have incomes over $8,000.
An examination of the time spent on the waiting list by applicants
simply will not move into a project like the Elm Haven Extension, an aging highrise, 60%
of whose population is on welfare. Interviews with White and Randall, supra, note 42;
interview with Norfleet, supra note 52.
59. See note 58 supra. In a sense, the tenant and applicant data is not precisely
comparable, because the welfare tenants include persons who work part-time. As a
result, the figure for welfare tenants is overstated. If welfare tenants were defined in the
same manner as welfare applicants, public housing would display an even smaller
percentage of welfare tenants.
60. Percentage of Tenants and Applicants*
at Various Income Levels
Project Annual Income
Under $4000 $4000 to $8000 Over $8000
"Low" "Middle" "High"
Applicants 62.5 35.2 2.3
All Tenants 54.1 36.3 9.7
Tenants in older units 57.7 33.8 8.4
Tenants in newer units 23.6 56.7 19.7
(since 1965)
Elm Haven 56.4 35.0 8.6
Quinnipiac Terrace 62.7 27.1 10.2
Farnum Courts 67.0 27.2 5.7
Rockview 47.6 41.3 11.1
Elm Haven Extension 54.2 38.0 7.8
County and Henry Streets 12.5 50.0 37.5
Riverview 16.7 83.3 0
Sheffield Manor 27.3 63.6 9.1
Essex Townhouses 21.2 66.7 12.1
Waverly St. Townhouses 30.8 44.2 25.0
Valley St. Townhouses 17.5 52.5 30.0
On whom data was available. Of the 283 applicants on whom no income data was
available, 87.4% were welfare recipients. This suggests that if the data were
complete, the income levels of the applicants would be pushed even further
downwards.
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with different social characteristics yields similar conclusions. 61 There
were only three two-parent families applying before 1970 that had not
yet been placed by September 1974. Fifty-four one-parent families that
applied at the same time were still waiting in 1974.62 There was only
one white family on the waiting list in 1969 that was not placed by
October 1974. More that twenty-five percent of the families that ap-
plied in 1974 were headed by a working person. Yet, of the families
who applied in 1972 or earlier and were still not placed by September
1974, only about ten percent were headed by a working person. This
implies that working applicants were placed in New Haven's units
more quickly than non-working applicants. 63
A recent study outlined the effects of this discrimination against
female heads of household receiving welfare assistance in Connec-
ticut. About forty-five percent of the families receiving Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) paid more for rent than is allotted
61. Demographic Characteristics of Applicants
by Year of Application, as of Oct. 31, 1974.
Black White or Other
1-parent 2-parent -parent 2-parent
Not Not Not Not
Year Total Working Working Working Working Working Working Working Working
1974 394 230 67 10 21 48 11 4 3
1973 518 345 103 10 11 40 4 1 4
1972 178 134 15 3 2 24 0 0 0
1971 46 35 5 0 0 6 0 0 0
1970 27 19 4 1 1 2 0 0 0
1969 7 6 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1968 12 10 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
1967 11 10 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1966 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1965 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Earlier 18 13 3 1 1 0 0 0 0
No Date 16 14 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
62. The only other possible explanation for the discrepancy between the percentage
of two-parent applicants and tenants is that the rate of applications from such families
has fallen in the last few years. There is no evidence that this has occurred. But if this
were so and if no preference system had been in force, then there would be more
two-parent families still waiting to be placed which had applied in 1968-1972. However,
there are very few two-parent families which applied before 1973 and have still not been
placed. See note 61 supra. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that two-parent families
are significantly favored.
63. This, too, is not likely to be attributable to a change in the application rate of




under the welfare system.64 As a result, these families had to dip into
part of their subsistence grant which is intended for utilities and other
necessities in order to pay rent. 65 In New Haven rents have been higher
than the statewide average. Thus, in order to rent a unit that was not
substandard, an AFDC mother with two children in 1974 had to pay
$59 per month more than she was allocated in her assistance grant.6
In addition, there is a severe housing shortage in New Haven.
Approximately twenty percent of New Haven's available rental stock
is substandard. 67 As of 1970, about 15,000 families were inadequately
housed. 68 Most of these families earned less than $6,000 per year. 69 It is
very difficult, therefore, for very low income families to find decent
64. CONN. ASS'N FOR HUMAN SERVICES, INFLATION AND WELFARE ALLOWANCES,
INFORMATION BULLETIN No. 5 (1975). All Connecticut welfare recipients of a given
family size receive a "flat grant award" of a given amount which depends solely on the
family size and the area of the state. The rate is based on the assumption that the family
will pay the median rental for apartments in that region of the state. CONN. ST. DEP'T OF
WELFARE, 1 WELFARE MANUAL § 5020 (1966). Welfare recipients in public housing would
never be assessed a rental higher than is permitted by their budget since the rental rate is
set by statute. 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(I) (Supp. V 1975), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1) (1969).
All the welfare recipients who pay excessive rents, therefore, live in private housing.
65. Families paying excess rents paid an average of $41 per month above what is
allotted to them for rent. Thus, a family of three receiving a monthly grant of $295.44 of
which $101.65 is allotted for rent, would be likely to spend $142 per month for rent,
leaving only $153 for utilities and all other needs. CONN. Ass'N FOR HUMAN SERVICES,
INFLATION AND WELFARE ALLOWANCES INFORMATION BULLETIN No. 5 (1975); CONN. ST.
DEP'T OF WELFARE, I WELFARE MANUAL § 5020 (1966).
66. A study based on newspaper advertisements for private rental units in New
Haven suggests that the median rental price of a two-bedroom apartment in the city in
1974 was $165 per month, which was $60 per month more than the maximum a Connec-
ticut AFDC family of three was allocated for rent, and $25 per month more than the
average rental paid by those recipients who were paying above the maximum rent. The
Housing Information Service estimated that it was necessary to pay the median rent to
obtain an apartment of standard quality. Housing Information Service, Community
Housing Inc., Monthly Summary of Rental Units (1974) (unpublished study on file with
the Urban Law Annual); see also CONN. ASS'N FOR HUMAN SERVICES, INFLATION AND
WELFARE ALLOWANCE INFORMATION BULLETIN No. 5 (1975). According to cost data in
NEW HAVEN CITY PLAN COMM'N, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ACTION PLAN FOR THE CITY
OF NEW HAVEN, WORKING PAPER No. 7 at 26 (1970), it appears that the present flat grant
assistance award would not have been sufficient even in 1967 to permit the rental of a
standard apartment for a family of three.
67. CITY OF NEW HAVEN HOUSING ASSISTANCE PLAN, Appendix I at 7 (1974). As used
by the city, "substandard" means failure to comply with local housing codes.
68. NEW HAVEN CITY PLAN COMM'N, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ACTION PLAN FOR
THE CITY OF NEW HAVEN, WORKING PAPER No. 7 at 45 (1970). This figure included
families living in substandard housing, in crowded conditions, and paying more than 25%
of their income for rent.
69. Id. at 5.
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private housing, especially if they are very large or very small
families. 70
Accordingly, a major impact of New Haven's admission policy is
that the people who are excluded from public housing live in substand-
ard private housing with rents disproportionate to their incomes. If the
housing authority admitted people on a first-come, first-serve basis
according to the date of application, probably all of the families that
applied before 1969 would have been admitted by September 1974. In
turn, some of the higher income people now in public housing would
have been excluded but they would have had less difficulty in finding
housing they could afford. Although this would not solve the financial
problems of the housing authority, it would certainly further the statu-
tory goal of providing a "decent home. . . for every American fam-
ily" by providing housing for those least able to obtain it in the private
market and by putting back into the private market tenants better able
to pay.
Furthermore, it is not clear that the goal of establishing balanced
neighborhoods has been achieved. While the current policy as im-
plemented in New Haven results in relatively "balanced" populations
within the newer housing projects' 71 it leaves untouched the high
concentrations in substandard private housing of black families, wel-
fare recipients or those below the poverty line, and families headed by
a woman. Almost forty percent of the city's black population lives in
private housing in three census tracts that contain only sixteen percent
of the city's population.72 Five census tracts house a disproportionate
percentage of the city's female-headed families. 73 Almost seventeen
percent of the families with incomes below the poverty level live in
neighborhoods that house only six percent of the city's total popula-
tion. 74 Finally, almost all New Haven AFDC recipients live within a
70. According to the housing plan, there is a serious shortage of units available for
low and moderate income households with one member or more than five members.
CITY OF NEW HAVEN HOUSING ASSISTANCE PLAN, Appendix II at 9-10 (1974).
71. See notes 58 & 60 supra.
72. The three census districts are numbers 5 (Hill), 6 (Hill) and 15 (Newhallville).
There are only 36 units of low income family public housing in these three neighbor-
hoods. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS TRACT REPORT, NEW
HAVEN, CONN. (No. PHC(1)142, 1970).
73. Census tracts number 1 (Central Business District), 3, 5, 6 (Hill), and 15
(Newhallville) house 18.8% of the city's families and 26.5% of the city's female-headed
families. There are no large, low income family public housing units within these
neighborhoods. Id.




mile of downtown, primarily in three neighborhoods. 5 Thus, while a
return to the first-come, first-serve selection process might shift the
mix of tenants in public housing further from the ideal espoused by the
local housing authority, it might also decrease the concentrations of
black families, poor families and welfare recipients in the neighbor-
hoods where they now live.
Implicit in the authority's method of implementation is an assump-
tion that housing projects are huge self-contained structures that domi-
nate the neighborhoods around them. This is not the case, however,
with regard to the newest housing units in New Haven where the
policies have been implemented most thoroughly. 76 These projects are
small, low density units with a maximum of fifty-four families, so their
impact on the demographic character of the neighborhood in which
they are located is minimal."7 Most housing authorities are planning to
follow New Haven's lead and build smaller units. 78 The policy, there-
fore, is not necessary to establish balanced neighborhoods so long as a
project is located within an area already having a varied population.
This analysis does not apply to the larger housing projects built in
the early years of public housing. It seems clear that the character of
these projects does have a major impact on its neighborhood. How-
ever, New Haven's experience suggests that little can be done to
create balanced communities in these projects, since it is difficult to
induce white, male-headed, working families to move into such
projects. 79
for a family of four. Under this definition, there are 712 families below the poverty level
in census tracts number 2 (Long Wharf - Church St. South), 3 (Hill) and 6 (Hill) and a
total of 4,276 families below the poverty level in the city. There are no large units of low
income family public housing in these neighborhoods. Id.
75. Telephone interview with David Matthews, Benedict Associates, Hamden,
Conn., Nov. 27, 1974. See BENEDICr ASsOCIATEs, STUDY OF RENTAL HOUSING COST-
FINAL DRAFr: AID TO FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN PROGRAM, STATE OF Connec-
ticut, 1973-1974 (1974).
76. Interview with Winston, supra note 40.
77. Only two of the newer, low-density housing projects in New Haven have been
built in neighborhoods already containing low-income family public housing. See note 36
supra.
78. It appears that New Haven plans to continue this pattern. NEW HAVEN HOUSING
AUTHORITY, ANNUAL REPORT (1974).
79. Interview with White, supra note 42. In January 1975 the housing authority did
attempt a massive but unsuccessful eviction effort, largely in these older projects, which
was alleged to have been intended to clear out enough welfare families to make it
possible to admit a balanced population. New Haven Tenants' Representative Council,
Inc. v. New Haven Housing Auth., 390 F. Supp. 831 (D. Conn. 1975) (granting tempo-
rary restraining order).
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III. "RATIONALITY" OF THE NEW HAVEN SELECTION CRITERIA:
LAW AND POLICY
The New Haven Housing Authority has implemented the policies of
the Housing and Community Development Act by selecting tenants on
the basis of income, source of income, race, sex of the head of the
household and the number of parents in the household. While the only
selection criterion explicitly authorized by the statute is income mix,
the Act also authorizes the use of tenant selection criteria that will
"avoid concentrations of low-income and deprived families with seri-
ous social problems.''80 Local housing authorities can argue that
criteria such as those used in New Haven are justified because they
would avoid such concentrations. 81
Local agencies have traditionally been given broad deference in
housing matters. 82 Although courts have overruled the policies of local
80. HCDA § 201d(c)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c)(4)(A) (Supp. V 1975), amending 42
U.S.C. § 1410(g) (1937).
81. If the housing authority does not jusify its priorities concerning race, sex and
source of income on the tenant selection language in the Act, it could be charged with
acting ultra vires in imposing criteria for admission to public housing not specifically
authorized by its enabling legislation. Generally, an administrative regulation cannot
stand if it is based on a justification exceeding the scope of its statutory authority.
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (Secretary of
Transportation may not exceed scope of his authority when authorizing use of federal
funds for construction of expressway); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 128 (1958) (Secre-
tary of State did not have authority to promulgate regulations which had effect of
denying passports to Communists). In particular, a state agency may not impose eligibil-
ity criteria not authorized by Congress when dispensing a federally funded benefit. Shea
v. Valpiando, 416 U.S. 251 (1974) (state may not adopt a standardized allowance for
work-related expenses and refuse to allow recipient to deduct expenses beyond the
standard); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970) (New York may not set standard of
need in manner not in accord with social security statute); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309
(1968) (welfare benefits may not be denied to eligible children if their mother "cohabits"
with man).
Since imposition of priorities based on race, sex of head of household and source of
income is not authorized in the Act unless by the tenant selection clause, any practice of
using such priorities is invalid as an imposition of eligibility criteria not created by
Congress. The Sixth Circuit relied in part on a similar line of reasoning to invalidate
tenant selection criteria based on income which were being used by the Louisville
Housing Authority before the passage of the Act. Fletcher v. Housing Auth., 491 F.2d
793, 803 (6th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded in light of Act, 419 U.S. 812 (1974),
judgment reinstated, 525 F.2d 532 (6th Cir. 1975).
82. Since the creation of public housing programs in 1937, enabling legislation has
stated:
It is the policy of the United States to promote the general welfare of the Nation




authorities when they have interfered with civil or constitutional rights
of tenants or applicants, 83 the courts have generally given deference to
the determinations of local authorities as long as their practices bear a
reasonable relationship to the low-rent housing program and are devoid
of illegal discrimination. 84 Thus, a housing authority can claim that its
policies of establishing communities balanced by race, sex of head of
household and source of income are permissible even though not
specifically mandated.
A. Race
By choosing to construct tenant populations in which the black and
other minority population is limited 85 relative to the number of such
families seeking access to public housing, 86 New Haven has clearly
drawn discriminatory lines on the basis of race. The question becomes,
then, whether such discrimination can be sustained against equal pro-
tection attacks on the ground that the discrimination is ultimately
intended to benefit the minority group, as well as other segments of
society, by promoting integration. Unlike most other "benign" dis-
crimination cases, 87 in which lines were drawn to provide blacks in-
States and their political subdivisions to remedy the unsafe and unsanitary housing
conditions and the acute shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for
families of low income and, consistent with the objectives of this Act, to vest in
local public housing agencies the maximum amount of responsibility in the admini-
stration of their housing programs.
42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1937), amended, HCDA § 201, 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (Supp. V 1975)
(emphasis added). See also S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
83. King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Auth., 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971)
(five-year residency requirement invalidated for public housing as denial of equal protec-
tion); Escalera v. New York City Housing Auth., 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970) (tenants of
public housing may not be evicted without adequate procedural safeguards); Holmes v.
New York City Housing Auth., 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968) (selection of tenants for
public housing must be made in accordance with ascertainable standards and in a
reasonable manner so as not to deny due process).
84. See, e.g., Pearsall v. Housing Auth., Pov. L. REP. (CCH) 18,436 (D. Conn.
1974) (relief denied to public housing applicant who alleged discrimination because she
was not accorded priority, even though she was being evicted from uninhabitable
premises); McDougal v. Tamsberg, 308 F. Supp. 1212 (D.S.C. 1970) (local authority may
not arbitrarily exclude applicant only because of presence of illegitimate children in
family; relief denied because of failure to show existence of discriminatory policy).
85. See notes 44-47 and accompanying text supra.
86. See note 61 supra.
87. E.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of
Calif., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680, cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 730 (1977).
See also notes 92-100 and accompanying text infra.
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creased access to a government benefit, perhaps at the expense of
whites, the discrimination by New Haven deprives blacks and other
minorities of a benefit, allegedly for their own good as well as for the
good of society.
A state may not discriminate on the basis of race unless the discrimi-
nation serves a compelling state interest. 88 When, however, discrimina-
tion has been intended to benefit minorities, it has sometimes been
upheld as "rational"; that is, having the "effect and objective of
reducing discrimination and segregation." 9 The appropriate standard
to be applied is less clear when steps aimed at promoting integration
are not in the immediate interest of minority group members. This
question was not squarely addressed by any member of Congress
during the debates on the 1974 Act, although it follows inevitably from
the conflicting imperatives of the Fair Housing Act and the 1937
Housing Act as amended. 90 The judicial answers are as yet tentative. In
the Second Circuit, at least, it appears that the state must sustain a
heavy burden to justify racial discrimination designed to promote
eventual integration which operates to deny an immediate benefit to
non-whites. 91
Integration is certainly a valid state goal.' In most situations, how-
ever, where a court has ordered that a state promote integration, the
state was providing an unlimited benefit, such as primary or secondary
88. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1964); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Takahashi v. Fish and Game
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 215 (1944); Ken-
nedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd,
436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 1010 (1971).
89. Pride v. Community School Bd., 488 F.2d 321, 326-27 (2d Cir. 1973); Hart v.
Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699, 741 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 37 (2d
Cir. 1975); see Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920,931-32
(2d Cir. 1968); Offerman v. Nitkowski, 378 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1967); Deal v. Cincinnati Bd.
of Educ., 369 F.2d 55, 61 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967); Springfield
School Comm. v. Barksdale, 348 F.2d 261, 266 (Ist Cir. 1965).
90. Compare Fair Housing Act § 801, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970) ("It is the policy of the
United States to provide . . . for fair housing throughout the United States."), with
HCDA § 101(c)(I)-(7), 42 U.S.C. § 5301(c)(1)-(7) (Supp. V 1975) (listing specific objec-
tives to further the primary purpose of "development of viable urban communities").
91. See Trinty Espiscopal School Corp. v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds and remanded, 523 F.2d 88 (2d Cir.
1975); Otero v. New York City Housing Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973). See also
Note, Benign Quota-Fair Housing-Affirmative Action Permits the Granting of Prefer-
ence to Whites in Public Housing to Insure Racial Integration: Otero v. New York City
Housing Authority, 20 WAYNE L. REv. 1109 (1974).




education, 93 parks94 or fair housing.9 5 When the state is attempting to
promote integration among recipients of a scarce benefit, such as
housing or state-supported university education, the criteria for dis-
tributing the benefit can be defined to create racial balance among the
recipients. When the benefit has historically been distributed primarily
to whites, the criteria would be defined to favor the minority group.
This has become a common practice in admission to public higher
education.9
Most recipients of public housing, unlike those of public higher
education, have been members of minority groups; promoting integra-
tion thus requires favoring whites at the expense of minority appli-
cants. At the same time, however, minorities are significantly disad-
vantaged in obtaining housing generally.97 Use of an admissions policy
which favors white applicants, therefore, would tend to promote inte-
gration but would not serve the compensatory function of such integra-
tion.98
In two cases on the use of racial quotas in public housing, the
agencies were required to meet a strict standard of proof to justify
their policies. 99 Although the intent is to create integrated housing, the
93. Id. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 336 n.18 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
94. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 206 (1966).
95. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
96. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 348 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See
generally Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 723
(1974).
97. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN: EQUAL OPPOR-
TUNITY IN HOUSING 137-67 (1975).
98. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 30, 507 P.2d 1169, 1181 (1973),
dismissed as moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) ("the denial of a 'benefit' on the basis of race is
not necessarily a per se violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, if the racial classifica-
tion is used in a compensatory way to promote integration").
99. In Otero v. New York City Housing Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1975), former
occupants of the site of a new public housing project, all members of a minority group,
challenged the New York City Housing Authority's refusal to grant them priority in the
new units despite its regulation giving priority to former site occupants. Defendants
maintained that adhering to their regulation would lead to the creation of a non-white
"pocket ghetto" and the eventual non-white ghettoization of the area. The Second
Circuit held that, although it may be permissible under some circumstances to disadvan-
tage some members of a minority group in the short run for the sake of promoting
integration, the housing authority had failed to show that adherence to its facially neutral
rule would lead to segregation. The court placed a heavy burden of proof on the housing
authority. The court was concerned that:
[t]o permit the Authority to take race, among other eligibility criteria, into consider-
ation in selecting tenants for public housing would, in the absence of a standard or
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effect of such quotas is to deny admission to public housing to many
black applicants."0
In New Haven, there is no evidence that the guidelines established
by the authority are related to some calculated tipping point or are
essential to promote a racially balanced community. The process does
not appear to have included any explicit consideration of the relevant
neighborhood in terms of racial balance, the existence of community
services and the attitudes of majority residents, as would appear to be
required by the decisions in Otero v. New York City Housing Author-
ity'0 and Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney.10 2 Even if this
regulation, allow it to engage in social engineering, subject only to general unde-
fined control through judicial supervision. . . . [T]he Authority's denial of housing
to a family because of its race could, whether or not labelled a "benign" quota,
constitute a form of unlawful racial discrimination in violation of the family's
constitutional rights.
Id. at 1135-36. In conclusion, the court stated that the housing authority could limit the
admission of members of minority groups "where it can show that such action is
essential to promote a racially balanced community and to avoid concentrated racial
pockets that will result in a segregated community." Id. at 1140.
The lower court was advised on remand to hear evidence and make findings with
respect to the relevant community to be considered with respect to racial balance, the
impact of adherence to the regulation on the white population of the community,
estimates of the racial composition of the urban renewal area upon completion and the
racial composition of the population eligible for public housing. Id. at 1137. On remand,
the case was settled. Pov. L. REP. (CCH) 118,640.
The holding of Otero was applied in Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 387 F.
Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds and remanded,
523 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1975), in which a private school and a group of middle-income
residents challenged changes in the West Side Urban Renewal Plan which would have
increased the low-income population of the area. The focus of the litigation was whether
the changes in the plan would cause the community to reach a racial tipping point; that is,
the point "at which a set of conditions has been created that will lead to the rapid flight
of an existing majority class under circumstances of instability which result in the
deterioration of the neighborhood environment." Id. at 1065. The court emphasized that
the plaintiff, like the defendant housing authority in Otero, must meet a stringent burden
of proof on the issue of tipping since "the proposed racial and economic classifications
while intended to preserve the area, would clearly result in a denial of public housing,
given the citywide need for such housing and the scarcity of alternative sites within the
City." Id. at 1066.
The opinion set out and discussed three criteria for determining whether a tipping
point had been reached: the absolute number of minority families, the quality of com-
munity services and the attitude of majority group residents. Id. at 1065-73. After
considering these factors, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that
tipping was likely and the court found for the defendants. This holding was affirmed by
the court of appeals. 523 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1975).
100. The evidence in New Haven is clear that black applicants have been passed over
in the application process. See notes 58 & 61 supra.
101. 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1975); see note 99 supra.
102. 387 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds




were to be done, it is unlikely that the population of units as small and
scattered as the newest projects would measurably affect the neighbor-
hood as a whole. If there is such an effect, it would have to be
established with great certainty to justify the imposition of quotas
under the holdings of Otero and Trinity, especially given the scarcity
of low-rent housing otherwise available. 103
On the other hand, it is almost impossible to use the tipping theory as
a rationale for limiting black applicants in order to desegregate huge,
antiquated and almost entirely black housing projects. 104 In these proj-
ects, there is no danger of chasing out white residents since there are
so few. 0 15 The justification here must be the high value placed on an
integrated environment by the national housing policy. But the likeli-
hood of a significant amount of integration in these units is small,
because of the reluctance of white residents to move in.'16 The social
benefit to be gained from such minimal integration is probably margi-
nal, since non-white families are not per se more likely than white
families to be problem tenants."17
Since the present admissions policy, as exemplified by New Haven's
implementation of income mix, tends to make it more difficult for a
non-white family to be placed than a white family, the allegedly benign
policy is in fact an impermissible exclusionary device, especially when
the housing authority has not shown that the quota system is essential
to prevent increased segregation.
B. Sex of Head of Household, Source of Income
and Level of Income
Distinctions made among applicants for public housing on the basis
of sex of the head of the household, 1' 8 source of income or level of
Housing Authority's statement describing tenant selection in HUD-funded programs,
the racial guidelines were established "as a result of the general consensus of the
management staff" on the importance of racial mix for the manageability of the project.
NHHA DESCRIIriON, supra note 37, at 1. More baldly, one official claimed that the
racial quotas were set "arbitrarily." Interview with Winston, supra note 40.
103. See notes 67-70 and accompanying text supra.
104. It may, in fact, be that the only way to deal with these units in a manner
consistent with the 1974 Act is to raze them.
105. See note 58 supra.
106. Interviews with White and Randall, supra note 42.
107. R. SCOBm, PROBLEM TENANTS IN PUBLIC HOUSING 9,99 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as R. SCOBIE].
108. There is some ambiguity as to whether the housing authority is concerned about
a balance of one- and two-parent families, or of male- and female-headed families. The
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income can be upheld under the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendent if they are rationally related to a valid objective of the
local housing authority. 109 It is the position of this Article that the
criteria adopted by New Haven do not effectuate the primary goals of
the income mixing provisions of the Act-the preservation of solvency
of local authorities and the creation of "healthier" neighborhoods." 0
This will be demonstrated through the use of empirical data. The
receptivity of a court to the use of such data as the basis of a legal
attack under the equal protection clause is unclear because of the
broad deference given to defendants when the rational relationship test
is used. Plaintiffs must show that there is no such relationship.",
Meeting the burden of proof becomes more difficult in the face of the
likely arguments of housing authorities that income mixing" 2 and
authority's description of New Haven's Housing Management Improvement Program
uses the latter categories but the computer printout of the applicants uses the former.
From conversations with officials of the authority, it appears that New Haven is chiefly
concerned about the presence of a male adult in the home.
It has been argued that sex, like race, should be a suspect classification. The Supreme
Court edged toward doing so in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), but has
since continued to evaluate sex-based classifications on a rationality test. See Geduldig
v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
It could be argued that the Court's refusal to use a standard of strict scrutiny in Kahn
did not indicate a rejection of that standard but rather a modification of it where the
statutory classification benefits women. If this was the rationale, then strict scrutiny
should be applied in cases involving sexual classifications employed to the detriment of
women. For the purposes of this Article, it will be assumed that a mere rationality test is
appropriate in sex discrimination cases. See generally Note, Sex Discrimination in
Welfare Legislation, 12 URBAN L. ANN. 125 (1976).
109. Traditionally, courts have held that a legislative classification scheme does not
deny equal protection of the laws so long as the scheme is rationally related to some valid
state objective; that is, the classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of
the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." F.S.
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406
U.S. 535 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). When the classification is
suspect, courts have subjected it to close scrutiny, and required that it be justified by a
compelling state interest. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Korematsu v. U.S., 323
U.S. 214 (1944) (racial classification).
110. Congress did not define its notion of social health in the debates preceding
passage of the Act. See notes 23-30 and accompanying text supra. The meaning of the
term "healthy" is therefore unclear. For the purposes of this Article, a healthy commu-
nity will be defined as one without a high rate of vandalism, social conflict or "problem
areas," as defined by housing authority officials. See notes 126-35 and accompanying
text infra.
Ill. See, e.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
112. It is possible to argue that discriminations based upon wealth that lead to an
absolute deprivation of a desired benefit should be subject to strict scrutiny in an equal




avoiding "concentrations of low-income and deprived families with
serious social problems" are themselves valid state goals because of
their inclusion in the Act.113
A local authority concerned about solvency is likely to rely on the
conventional wisdom that poor families, including welfare recipients,
and female-headed families are more expensive to house because they
are more likely to get behind in rent payments and to cause excessive
maintenance costs. 1 4 But conventional wisdom is not evidence and
courts have invalidated housing authority regulations that have dis-
criminated against welfare recipients on this basis." 5
(1974), sets out criteria under which a classification based on wealth may be subjected to
strict scrutiny.
The precedents of this Court provide the proper starting point. The individuals, or
groups of individuals, who constituted the class discriminated against in our prior
cases shared two distinguishing characteristics: because of their impecunity they
were completely unable to pay for some desired benefit, and as a consequence,
they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that
benefit.
Id. at 20. The problem with such broad language is that the cases cited by the Court all
involved fundamental rights. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (access to ballot);
Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (incarceration of indigents unable to pay fine);
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (incarceration because of inability to pay fine);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (access to transcript in criminal appeals). Housing,
however, has never been held to be a funamental right under the constitution.
The degree to which the present system results in absolute deprivation for the lowest
income applicants can be shown by a comparison with an alternative allocative mecha-
nism that Congress could have chosen. If Congress had chosen to allocate places in
public housing by setting the rental in all public housing units at some flat rate, such as
$50 per month below the market rate, then most low-income families would not have
been absolutely deprived of public housing since they could choose to spend a greater
portion of their income on housing. In contrast, under the Act, a family denied a place in
public housing because of its indigency does not have the option of offering to pay more
of its income for rent and thus obtaining housing; instead, it is absolutely excluded.
113. For a discussion of the problems inherent in defining the legislative purpose for
the rational relationship test, see Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal
Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972).
It is always possible to define the legislative purpose of a statute in such a way that
the statutory classification is rationally related to it. . . . The nature of the burdens
or benefits created by a statute and the nature of the chosen class's commonality
will always suggest a statutory purpose-to so burden or benefit the common trait
shared by members of the identified class. A statute's classifications will be
rationally related to such a purpose because the reach of the purpose has been
derived from the classifications themselves. Legislative purpose so defined is
nearly tautological but it is also the purpose suggested by the plain terms of the
statute.
Id. at 128.
114. See, e.g., Starr, Which of the Poor Shall Live in Public Housing?, 23 THE PUB.
INTEREST 116 (1971).
115. In Colon v. Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), a suit challenging the policy of a city housing authority to exclude welfare
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Moreover, empirical studies tend to discredit these assumptions. A
recent study of public housing tenants in Wilmington, Delaware, found
that sex of the head of household, number of parents in the home,
source of income or size of income were not good indicators of
whether a family would cause excessive costs. 116 These costs were
defined by a formula that included rent delinquency and maintenance
charges resulting from abuse of property."f7 This study suggests that
recipients, the court noted:
Regarding the welfare recipients' reliability as to payment of the monthly rent, it
would seem that some welfare recipients may have a history of delinquency in their
payments whereas others may be dependable. . . . [W]here the welfare recipient
has been known to be reliable and where his application for tenancy has been
approved by the Department of Social Services as being compatible with his
support budget, it would be an arbitrary classification in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to reject that applicant, despite
whatever personal qualities he may possess, solely on the basis of the applicant's
status as a recipient of welfare funds.
Id. at 138.
In a similar suit challenging a rental agent's refusal to admit welfare recipients to a
private apartment complex which was part of an urban renewal project, the Second
Circuit declared that "the state or its alter egos may not relegate welfare recipients to
second-class citizenship solely because they receive welfare subsistence." Male v.
Crossroads Assocs., 469 F.2d 616, 622 (2d Cir. 1972). See Battle v. Municipal Housing
Auth., 53 F.R.D. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (requirement that leases of tenants who are
welfare recipients must be cosigned by the Westchester County Department of Social
Services is not rationally related to the goal of maintaining the local housing authority's
solvency and invidiously discriminates against welfare recipients).
116. HOUSING MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM, HUD, WHA's APPLICANT
PREDICTION MODEL 28, 69-70 (1975). What makes the contrast between this study and the
Starr article so striking is the difference in the support they offer for their conclusions.
Starr cites no support for his contention that "[ilt is the fatherless households that cause
the most vandalism," Starr, supra note 114, at 117-18, and he infers from Sternlieb's
study of New York housing that welfare tenants cause housing to deteriorate, even
though Sternlieb does not believe his data supports such a connection, and notes that
social science research on the subject has been "permeated with folklore rather than
clear findings." G. STERNLIEB & B. INDIK. THE ECOLOGY OF WELFARE: HOUSING AND
THE WELFARE CRISIS IN NEW YORK 11-12, 72 (1973). Sternlieb did find a statistical
correlation between substandard housing and the presence of welfare recipients as noted
by Starr, id. at 75, but expressly declined to draw a causal connection. Id. at 64, 66-67,
89.
In contrast, the Wilmington study was the result of a detailed analysis of the social
characteristics of tenants who caused excessive costs to the housing authority. The
study was funded by HUD's Housing Management Improvement Program as the first
step in the development of a prototype applicant prediction model which could be used
by other housing authorities as well. HOUSING MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM,
HUD, WHA's APPLICANT PREDICTION MODEL 40 (1975). Ironically, the Wilmington
Housing Authority has disregarded totally the results of its own study and has adopted
tenant selection criteria which closely parallel those of the New Haven Housing Authori-
ty. Telephone interview with Mary Hitchener, Executive Director, Wilmington Housing
Authority, April 21, 1975.
117. The study defined excessive cost by means of a formula including rent delin-




discrimination against public housing applicants for the reasons given
above is not rationally related to the goal of maintaining an authority's
solvency through seeking to decrease maintenance costs and rent
delinquency.
Since continued solvency is a valid state goal, however, a local
housing authority may discriminate on the basis of wealth in a way that
is rationally related to that goal. An authority is permitted to charge
higher rents to higher income tenants.' 18 Admitting higher income
applicants leads to greater rent receipts and decreases the likelihood of
insolvency. The problem with this selection criterion, at least from a
policy standpoint, is that there is nothing in the Act to require that a
local authority admit only enough higher income tenants to prevent its
insolvency. Thus, an authority might subsidize its own inefficiency
with the rentals of higher income tenants, to the detriment of the other
basic social objective of providing low-income housing. 1 9 Fostering
inefficiency in government agencies is not a valid state interest. To the
contrary, each local housing authority is required to show, as a condi-
tion for receiving an annual subsidy, that it is following "sound man-
agement practices . . . in the operation of the project."' 120 A local
housing authority with a preference for higher income tenants should
be required to show that its policy is rationally related to the legitimate
interest of remaining solvent, that the authority is operating its units
according to good management principles and is still failing to remain
solvent, and that it is favoring higher income tenants only to the extent
necessary to avoid insolvency. A recent study of fourteen local hous-
ing authorities shows that many of them operate inefficiently and that
application of sound management principles would significantly de-
crease reliance on HUD subsidies.121 One source of inefficiency would
uct of the number of months the tenant was in arrears, the average monthly rental paid
by delinquent tenants and a constant, representing the likelihood that the tenant will pay
off his rental arrears debt. This constant depended on whether the tenant had signed and
was honoring a repayment agreement. The excessive maintenance factor was computed
as the sum of two dollar amounts: the actual dollar value of maintenance fee in arrears,
multiplied by a constant, representing the likelihood that the debt would be repaid; and
the estimated expenditure or saving to be incurred by the housing authority when the
tenant moves out based on the tenant's treatment of the premises. HOUSING MANAGE-
MENT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM. HUD, WHA's APPLICANT PREDICTION MODEL, 16-23
(1975).
118. HCDA § 20la(l), 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(1) (Supp. V 1975), amending 42 U.S.C. §
1407(1) (1937).
119. See notes 7-9 and accompanying text supra.
120. HCDA § 201d(c)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c)(4) (Supp. V 1975).
121. GOV'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LOCAL HOUSING AUTHORITIES CAN IMPROVE THEIR
OPERATIONS AND REDUCE DEPENDENCE ON OPERATING SUBSIDIES (1975).
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be eradicated if local authorities were to establish more equitable rent
schedules since over-income tenants are now being charged a lower
percentage of their incomes as rent than are lower-income tenants.12
For example, if the New York City Housing Authority charged over-
income tenants a rent that would cover operating costs, it could re-
cover an additional nine million dollars per year and still be within the
twenty-five per cent maximum. 123 This would have increased its rental
income by ten per cent annually and would have decreased its need for
a HUD subsidy by more than twenty per cent. 124 Similarly, inefficien-
cies resulting from inadequate rent collection procedures and inade-
quate attention to vacancies cause substantial financial losses to local
authorities.'15 If these inefficiencies were eliminated, it would be possi-
ble to maintain a housing authority's solvency without weighting the
admissions process too heavily in favor of higher-income applicants.
The alternative justification advanced for discrimination on the basis
of amount and source of income, and sex of head of household is that
neighborhoods are socially healthier if they do not have concentrations
of female-headed families and poor people, including welfare recip-
ients. 26 This theory has never been ratified in housing legislation. 127
Case law has not addressed the constitutionality of discrimination
against female-headed families. At least one case has specifically dis-
approved discrimination against welfare recipients when they were
absolutely denied acess to a subsidized housing project.128 Other cases
have held discrimination on the basis of welfare recipiency and pover-
ty to be improper when plaintiffs argued that persons should be ex-
122. Id. at 19.
123. Id. at 15.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 31, 45.
126. Interview with White, supra note 42; see notes 27-30 and accompanying text
supra for views of members of Congress.
127. The Act does not state that local housing authorities should avoid tenants who
are welfare recipients or in which the family is headed by a female; rather it says that
authorities should avoid "concentrations of low-income and deprived families with
serious social problems." HCDA § 201d(c)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c)(4) (Supp. V 1975).
While Congress might have said that there is a state interest in creating projects inte-
grated according to sex of head of household and source of income, it did not do so. It
did attempt to create projects integrated by wealth. But see notes 117-19 and accompany-
ing text supra.
128. Colon v. Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
The court noted that it was a legitimate goal for the apartment complex to seek tenants
who would cooperate with one another. But it rejected this as a rationale for excluding
welfare recipients: "It appears clear to this Court that a welfare recipient need not be an




cluded on the basis of those factors.12 9 In New Haven, however, there
is no absolute bar to welfare recipients and the very poor, although
admission of such groups is limited. On the empirical level there is little
factual support for the contention that limiting the number of poor
persons, including welfare recipients, and female-headed families in
public housing creates "healthier" communities. 130 A recent study of
the Boston Housing Authority indicated no correlation between prob-
lem areas, as defined by housing authority officials, and concentra-
tions of either female-headed families or welfare recipients.13' The
study also found no correlation between the sex of the head of house-
hold or source of income and the existence of conflict 32 or aggressive
antisocial behavior. 133 To the extent that property abuse would be
considered a sign of an unhealthy community, the Boston findings are
reinforced by the Wilmington study which also noted a lack of correla-
129. Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners v. Lynn, 372 F. Supp. 147 (N.D. IIl. 1973),
aff'd, 524 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1975); Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 387 F.
Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds and remanded,
523 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1975) (The Second Circuit specifically affirmed the opinion of the
district court as to discrimination against poor people.)
In Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners, a community organization contended that HUD
had to file an environmental impact statement before building a public housing project on
the theory that low-income tenants would be more likely to be criminal and violent, and
have little regard for property and hard work. 372 F. Supp. at 148-49. In rejecting
plaintiff's position, the court refused to rely on the testimony of plaintiff's expert
witnesses, two social scientists, who contrasted the probable behavior of public housing
tenants and the probable behavior of the plaintiffs. Id. at 150.
In Trinity Episcopal School Corp., plaintiffs argued that permitting an increased
number of low-income residents in their neighborhood would lead to neighborhood
deterioration. The court rejected this argument. 387 F. Supp. at 1079. The court also
rejected plaintiffs' argument that an increased poor population would lead to "tipping"
analogous to "ghettoization" which allegedly accompanies over-concentration of black
families in a particular neighborhood. Id. at 1065.
130. See, e.g., Starr, supra note 114, at 116. Starr provides no more statistical
support for his contention that concentrations of welfare families have adverse social
effects, than for his contention that they cause property damage, see note 116 supra; nor
do the congressional hearings provide any factual analysis of the social characteristics of
"healthy" neighborhoods, see notes 27-30 supra.
131. R. SCOBE, supra note 107, at 59, 63, 96-97, 101, 106. In this study, "problem
areas" were defined by asking several public housing project managers to mark on maps
those areas which they considered to be, or which were generally known to be, problem
areas. Typically, the areas were associated with a high incidence of vandalism or the
presence of derelicts, were used as teenage hangouts, or had very large and disruptive
families in them. Scobie found that the only common characteristic of problem areas was
their design. Id. at 55, 63, 70, 73, 96, 97. Scobie did not treat income level as a variable in
his study.
132. Id. at 70, 73. A complaint log was kept for a period of ten weeks to record
inter-tenant conflict.
133. Id. at 60.
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tion between social characteristics and excessive maintenance cost. 13 4
Thus exclusion of female-headed families, poor persons and welfare
recipients from public housing does not appear to be an effective way
to create "healthy" communities. 35
Furthermore, even if it could be shown that communities composed
of persons with varied incomes that also contain a balance of welfare
recipients, working families and of one- and two-parent families were
socially desirable, it would still not prove that exclusionary housing
authority admissions policies are an effective means of achieving this
goal. Some neighborhoods dominated by private housing have ex-
tremely high concentrations of poor persons, welfare recipients and
female-headed families.136 Given this fact, following the policy in pub-
lic housing may be not only ineffective but counterproductive. 13 7
IV. A PERMISSIBLE METHOD OF IMPLEMENTING
INCOME MIX POLICY
The goal of creating balanced communities within public housing
would clearly cause no problems if there were enough subsidized
housing available for all families who might be deemed eligible. But
even given the shortage of such housing, less offensive means than
discriminatory admissions criteria are available. Some of these tech-
niques are suggested by the Act itself. Housing authorities could allow
over-income tenants to remain in public housing, charge them rental
rates commensurate with their incomes and the operating costs of the
134. See notes 116-117 and accompanying text supra.
135. Scobie concludes:
[T]his study of problem tenants and of the process through which they are iden-
tified gives no support to the arguments that by screening out problem families or
dependent families, or any other general category, we might be able to produce
relatively problem-free residential areas.
R. ScOBIE, supra note 107, at 75.
136. See notes 72-75 and accompanying text supra.
137. The fear that the policy would in fact be counterproductive was expressed
during the hearings on the Act by Anthony Henry, President, National Tenants Organi-
zation, who objected to:
[the] desire to make "model communities" of public housing enclaves at the
expense of the outside community by keeping down the number of very poor
residents. While this may perhaps aid the public housing project, it works severe
hardships on the very poorest who cannot afford housing in the private market and
are condemned to cold, overcrowded vermin-infested slums that shorten their lives
and kill their morale and initiative.
Hearings on S. 2490, 2507, 2508 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and




unit, and eliminate other sources of inefficiency. 138 Eligibility limits
could be raised, thereby opening public housing to a population repre-
senting a broader income range. To be effective, this step would have
to be accompanied by improvements in existing projects to attract such
applicants. 3 9 In addition, in cities where public housing tenants now
have a range of incomes but tend to live in units segregated by income,
families could be transferred to create mixtures within a given unit.140
For the future, scatter-site housing is a necessary element of any
long-term, meaningful solution since it can effectively create mixed
neighborhoods. If a small unit of public housing of no more than thirty
or forty units is placed in a neighborhood of primarily private housing,
it need not change the demographic character of the whole neighbor-
hood causing tipping problems. If the applicant pool of the housing
authority tends to have homogeneous characteristics, whether of race,
income or sex, then a balanced community can be created by placing
the units in neighborhoods with a different mix of characteristics.
The idea of building low density, low-income housing units is not
new. 141 Increasingly, housing authorities are moving away from high-
rise construction to small developments scattered over a large region.
These have met with less resistance from communities since the latter
need not fear that their unique characteristics will be altered by an
influx of a large new population. 142 In fact, communities have no
138. See notes 121-25 and accompanying text supra; Supp. Brief for Appellants on
Remand at 13, Fletcher v. Housing Auth., 491 F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1974), vacated and
remanded, 419 U.S. 812 (1974), judgment reinstated, 525 F.2d 532 (6th Cir. 1975).
139. Supp. Brief for Appellants on Remand at 13, Fletcher v. Housing Auth., 491
F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 419 U.S. 812 (1974), judgment rein-
stated, 525 F.2d 532 (6th Cir. 1975).
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., Navasky, The Benevolent Housing Quota, 6 How. L.J. 30, 66-68
(1960). The first units built by the New Haven Housing Authority in 1941 were low-
density structures of no more than three stories, scattered over several city blocks. See
NEW HAVEN HOUSING AuruoRrry, ANNUAL REPORT 15 (1968); note 36 supra. Although
many public housing units in New Haven and around the country fit the public
stereotype of crowded highrises, at least 80% of the nation's public housing units do not.
In fact, only in the largest cities with populations of more than 500,000 are highrise
buildings common for family units. Hearings on H.R. 10036, 7227, 10688 and 10689
Before the Subcomm. on Housing of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, 1301 (1973), reprinting NAT'L AsS'N OF HOUSING AND REDEV.
OFFICIALS, MYTHs/REALrrIES OF URBAN RENEWAL, summarized in 30 J. OF HOUSING 170
(April 1973).
142. Hearings on H.R. 10036, 7227, 10688, and 10689 Before the Subcomm. on
Housing of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, 1085
(1973), reprinting NAT'L ASsoc. OF REGIONAL COUNCILS, STRAIGHT TALK ABOUT Hous-
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reason to fear that a small low-income housing project will hurt their
neighborhoods. 143 Thus, scatter-site housing provides an acceptable
way to create balanced communities, not only within public housing
but in the larger neighborhood, without requiring invidious dis-
crimination.
Scatter-site housing does not address the goal of making public
housing economically self-sufficient. If, however, a major goal of the
national housing policy is to remain that of "remedying the acute
shortage of decent, safe and sanitary dwellings for families of low
income,"' 144 there are only a few realistic options for limiting subsidies
to present levels. One possibility would be to provide public housing
units to the most needy. Since this policy would of necessity not be
self-supporting, it would require limiting the number of units to the
number that current subsidies could support. A second alternative
would be to permit persons with higher incomes to apply for public
housing and to build enough units so that all applicants could be
accepted at a sufficient range of rentals to make the program
self-supporting.
If neither of these solutions is politically or economically feasible,
then Congress and the courts must come to grips with the irony that
low-income housing authorities, created to house the poor, are being
pressured by economic constraints to close their doors to the poor. The
national housing policy, as implemented in New Haven and elsewhere,
may have lost sight of the basic human need it was intended to serve.
ING YOUR REGION 7 (1973). But see Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Dev. Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977) in which a suburb of Chicago refused to rezone a tract
within its boundaries to accommodate proposed racially integrated low- and moderate-
income housing. The suburbs action was challenged as having a racially discriminatory
effect and thus violating the equal protection clause. The Supreme Court found no
constitutional violation, but did not decide whether the refusal to rezone violated the
Fair Housing Act. A refusal to rezone for low-income housing might have a substantial
effect on scatter-site housing. But, cf. City of Hartford v. Towns of Glastonbury, West
Hartford and East Hartford, 45 U.S.L.W. 2339 (D. Conn. Jan. 1977) (town ineligible for
federal community development grant until it submits accurate assessment of housing
needs of low income persons expected to reside there).
143. For example, a study of the Boston Housing Authority showed that the only
characteristics consistently associated with "problem areas" in public housing were high
density projects with a high concentration of large apartments and a correspondingly
large number of children. R. ScoBIE, supra note 107, at 63.
144. HCDA § 201, 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (Supp. V 1975), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1401
(1937).
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